

Curriculum Vita, December 2011

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EDUCATION

University of Pennsylvania	Ph.D. 1973	Psychology
University of Pennsylvania	M.A. 1971	Psychology
University of Chicago	B.A. 1970	Psychology

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

2003-now	Professor	Dept. of Psychology	Princeton Univ.
2000-2003	Professor	Dept. of Computer Science	Rice University
1997-2003	Professor	Dept. of Psychology	Rice University
1996-1997	Docente	Università San Raffaele	Milan, Italy
1995-1997	Director	Unità di Razionalità	Milan, Italy
1991-1994	Director	Institut d'Intelligence Artificielle	Martigny, Switz.
1978-1991	Professor	Dept. Brain & Cognitive Sciences	M.I.T.
1986-1991	Professor	Dept. Linguistics & Philosophy	M.I.T.
1977-1978	Assoc. Prof.	Dept. Psychology	U/Pennsylvania
1975-1977	Assist. Prof.	Dept. Psychology	U/Pennsylvania
1973-1975	Assist. Prof.	Dept. Psychology	Stanford Univ.

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